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inviolate function of the legislature and which affected the right or duties
of the citizens of the state. They pronounced the rule with that in mind.
Such application was carrying out the purpose and policy of the rule.
In the Harbage case, no such situation prevails. Impeachment of
the journals will not interfere with the legislature in its official duties nor
will it confuse the rights of the public. In applying the doctrine to the
present facts certain questions should be asked. Does the legislature's
appropriation of unearned mileage allowance to itself constitute a situa-
tion similar to the decided cases? Will the questioning of the journal
records in this case violate the separation of powers? Does it upset the
rights and duties of the people by disclosing a mere procedural defect?
These questions must be answered in the negative. Every rule of law
should have a reason and a purpose and these should be kept in mind.
Otherwise, by blind application, the court becomes a legal mechanic and
not a referee dispensing justice. Allowance of parol testimony to show
the actual facts here will not violate either of the policies giving rhyme
and reason to the rule.
Here is a case which falls without the rule and the latter should not
be mouthed by courts divorced from the purpose and policy which created
it. Here is not a respected and impeccable legislative action, but here is
merely a legislative "steal"--a recompense for doing nothing.
At this writing, Harbage v. Tracy is still in the throes of controversy
in the court of common pleas, but if the case be appealed, it will be hoped
the superior courts will abstain from a mechanical adherence to a rule
which has no relation to the facts at hand.
JAMES M. GORMAN
EQUITY
THE FusION OF LAW AND EouiTY - VENDOR AND PURCHASER
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently considered the question
whether a vendor in an executory contract of sale containing dependent
covenants may, after tender of deed and deposit thereof in court, main-
tain an action at law on such executory contract for the unpaid purchase
price. The court repudiated the holdin gof the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth District1 on this point of law, although it affirmed the decision
because the tender was not good in fact.2
The two traditional remedies available to the vendor, upon default
'Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, z7 Ohio L. Abs. ig (1938).
2 Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E. (zd) x (x938).
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of the vendee in an executory contract, were an action at law for dam-
ages for breach of the contract' or a suit in equity for specific perform-
ance." There is a pronounced divergence of opinion as to the availability
of a third remedy; viz., an action at law on the contract for the purchase
price, which was sought in the principal case. A substantial minority
allow such an action at law,' thus awarding what really amounts to
specific performance in a legal action.' However, other jurisdictions
3 Eisenstadt v. Lucke, z5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 225, 35 Ohio C.D. 244 (i915), see
cases collected in 52 A.L.R. i5xi (1928).
' The Eleventh St. Church, etc. v. Pennington, IS Ohio C.C. 408, lo Ohio C.D. 74-
(I896)i Brewing Co. v. Maxwell, et al., 78 Ohio St. 54, 84 N.E. 595 (1908).
'California: North Stockton Lot Co. v. Fischer, 138 Cal. o0, 70 P. Io8 (902);
Bonner v. Finney, ilo Cal. App. 5S8, 294 Pac. 466 (1930); Amaranth Land Co. v. Corey,
18z Cal. 66, z86 Pac. 765 (i92O). Code of Civil Procedure adopted Is85o.
Colorado: Gilpin Co. Mining Co. v. Drake, 8 Colo. S86, 9 Pac. 787 (i886); Code
of Civil Procedure adopted 1877.
Georgia: Morris v. McKee, 96 Ga. 611, 24 S.E. 14Z (i895); Reed v. Dougherty,
94. Ga. 661, 20 S.E. 965 (1894); see also Crim v. Southern Realty Co-, 38 Ga. App. 5o2,
144 S.E. 342 (i928). Georgia is a quasi-code state. See, CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 19.
Idaho: Smith v. Independent School District, 48 Idaho 295, 282 Pac. 84 (1929).
Code of Civil Procedure adopted 1864.
Illinois: Gray v. Meek, 599 Ill. 136, 64 N.E. ozo (19o); Thurman v. Alcott,
235 Ill. App. 545 (1924). (I1. is a common-law state.)
Maine: Oatman v. Walker, 33 Me. 67 (1851).
Michigan: Kreuger v. Campbell, 264 Mich. 449, 250 N.W. 285, dictum (1933);
St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670, 262 N.W. 437 (I935).
Mississippi: Hodges v. Moore, 1o2 Miss. 432, 59 So. 827 (1912). Miss. is a quasi-
code state. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 19.
Nevada: Southern Pac. Co. v. Miller, 39 Nev. 169, 154 Pac. 929 (z916); Adopted
Code of Civil Procedure s86o.
North Carolina: Garrard v. Dollar, 49 N.C. 175, 67 Am. Dec. 271 (1856) ; Paschal
v. Brandon, 79 N.C. 505 (1878). Adopted Code of Civil Procedure iS68.
Oklahoma: Dubois v. Andrews, 57 Okla. 227, 152 Pac. 440 (1916) (suit on a note);
but see Scott v. Norris, 6z Okla. 29z, 16z Pac. io8S (1917). Code of Civil Procedure
adopted 189 o.
Pennsylvania: McClenachan v. hMalis, 310 Pa. 99, 164 Atl. 780 (1933); Heights
Land Co. v. Swengel's Estate, 319 Pa. 298, 179 Afl. 431 (93S) (where the court held an
action for the purchase price was really a substitute for specific performance). Pa. is a
quasi-code state. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 19.
Texas: Phillips v. Macabees, 50 S.W. (2d) 478 (1932).
Virginia: Turner v. Hall, 128 Va. 247, 104 S.E. 861 (1920).
Washington: Stevens v. Irwin, 132 Wash. 389, 231 Pac. 783 (195).
Wisconsin: Foster v. Lowe, 131 Wis. 54, 11o N.V. 829 (1907); Oconto Co. v.
Bacon, 181 Wis. 538, 195 N.W. 412, 40 A.L.R. 175 (1923); Jefferson Gardens, Inc. v.
Terzan, 216 Wis. 230, 257 N.W. '54 (1934). Adopted Code of Civil Procedure 1856.
Iowa and New York have overruled their positions allowing the vendor to recover
the purchase price at law. See: Prichard v. Mulhall, 127 Iowa 545, 103 N-.W 774, 4 Ann.
Cas. 789 (z9O5), overruling the view in Goodpaster v. Porter, et al., ii Iowa 161 (i86o);
also Bensinger v. Erhardt, 74 App. Div. 169, 77 N.Y. Sup. 577 (1902), overruling
Richards v. Edick, 17 Barb. (N.Y.) 260 (853). But see 9ueen's Park Garden v. Spar,
234 N.Y. Sup. 404 (1929), where the contract gave the vendor an option to sue for the
purchase price. Those cases allowing such an action by the vendor while still possessed of
the title and property, proceed upon the theory that, although the action is in form at law,
it still invokes the equitable powers of the court to such a degree as to enable it to make
such orders and directions in respect to enforcement of the judgment as to protect all
parties concerned.
6 "An action at law by the vendor for the unpaid purchase price of an executory con-
tract is in effect an action for specific performance of the contract)" Black, et al. v. Amer-
ican International Corp., 264 Pa. 26o, 107 Atl. 737 (1919); Hoover, et al., Exrs. v.
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adopt the position that no such remedy exists at law, but that the vendor
is confined to his remedies of specific performance or an action for dam-
ages for breach of contract.'
Though the court in the principal case purported to follow Will-O-
Way Development Co. v. Mills, this question had never previously
been passed upon in Ohio by the highest tribunal.9 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth District held, on comparable facts in Rowland,
.4dm'r, etc. v. Stout, Exr, etc.," precisely the contrary view to that
considered in the principal case; that is, that such an action at law
would not lie. It would seem, however, that the principal case lays
down the present rule in Ohio, although the Supreme Court did not
distinguish the Rowland case or mention it in the opinion. The theory
of the Supreme Court was that the allowance of such an action was
sanctioned by the liberality of procedure and practice established by the
7Alabama: Maury v. Unruh, zzo Ala. 455, iz6 So. 113 (1930); Alabama is a
quasi-code state. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 19.
Florida: Wood Hoskins Young Co. v. Dittman, ioz Fla. ooo, 136 So. 710 (1931).
Florida adopted the Code of Civil Procedure in 187 o , but repudiated it in 1873 and went
back to the common law system.
Indiana: Goodwine v. Kelley, 33 Ind. App. 57, 70 N.E. 832 (1904). Adopted Code
of Civil Procedure 185z.
Iowa: Prichard v. Mulhall, 127 Ia. 545, 103 N.W. 774, 4 Ann. Cas. 789 (19os);
But see First Nat. Bank v. Le Barron, 2o1 Iowa 853, zo8 N.W. 364. (z9z6). Adopted
Code of Civil Procedure 18gi.
Massachusetts: Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Evans, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 25 (1856).
Mass. is a quasi-code state. See, CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 19.
Mindiesota: Freeman v. Paulson, 107 Minn. 64, 19 N.W. 651, 131 Am. St. Rep.
438 (5909). See also Noyes v. Brown, 171 N.W. 803 (1919), effect of independent cove-
nants.) Code of Civil Procedure adopted 1851.
Missouri: Scudder v. Waddingham, 7 Mo. App. 26 (1879). Adopted Code of Civil
Procedure 1849.
Nebraska: Colson v. Johnson, ii Neb. 773, 197 N.W. 674, 35 A.L.R. 924. (1924).
Adopted Code of Civil Procedure i855.
New Hampshire: Griswold v. Sabin, 51 N.H. z67 (187x).
South Dakota: Jones v. Tscketter, 46 S.D. 520, 194 N.W. 839 (1923). Adopted
Code of Civil Procedure i862.
I 2Z Ohio St. 242, 171 N.E. 94 (1930)-
o Distinguish the cases allowing recovery of purchase price, on theory of equitable
conversion, when the vendee is in possession. Woloveck v. Schueler, 59 Ohio App. 21o
(2zz); Purcell v. Heeny, z8 Ohio St. 39 (1875).
Compare Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 119oz, wherein it is stated that in actions for recovery
of purchase price of real estate, the vendee may set up the defense of breach of covenants
of title by way of counter-claim, the statute presupposing the vendee in possession and
holding title. For interpretation, see Cincinnati v. Brachman, 35 Ohio St. 289 (s88o).
' 8 Ohio L. Abs. 376 (x93o) [approved by Court of Appeals in Fairlawn Heights
Co. v. Theis, 27 Ohio L.Abs. x9 (1938)]. Mauch, J., speaking for the court, felt that
their position was even more secure due to the fact that the court through Allen, J., in
Will-O-Way-Development Co. v. Mills (see note 8, supra.) expressly approved Prichard v.
Mulhall, 127 Iowa 545, 103 N.W. 774, 4 Ann. Cas. 789 (T9o5), which stated that, "Upon
breach by the vendee of an executory contract of sale of land, the vendor's remedy is n
action for specific performance or at law for damages, and an ordinary action for the
recovery of the purchase price will not lie." Mauch, J., also pointed out that there was no
necessity in the Will-O-Way case to decide whether an action at law for the purchase price
was maintainable, for there was no proper tender.
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code. An examination of the record and parties' briefs in the principal
case demonstrates that all concerned, both court and counsel, thought of
this action as purely legal, for the pleadings were so drawn and the
judgment so framed as to constitute an action for the recovery of money
only.
A single court of law and equity combined has taken the place of the
former independent and separate courts of law and equity since the
adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 185 3." There now exists
but one system of jurisprudence to be administered in an action called a
"civil action,"' 2 the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
having been abandoned so far as relates to mere matters of form and
procedure. 3 If a cause of action is stated in the pleadings, the nature
and character of relief to be awarded is determined by the court, whether
legal or equitable, or- both, according to the facts pleaded, 4 and the
mere form of the action is to be disregarded."5 However, the Code
expressly states that no substantive rights are affected thereby." "What
was equitable continues to be equitable, and what was legal continues as
before. But all forms of relief may be had under the Code in a single
action, settling every controversy between the parties, whether leghl or
equitable."1
""This system can not be called either legal or equitable as these terms were
anciently used. It is a combination of the two, wherein the substantive jural relation
enforced by the court in the first instance is the same as would ultimately have been pre-
served under the old system by a roundabout method of a proceeding in equity to prevent
its unenforcement at law." 3z Yale L.J. 701 (1922).
12 Ohio Gen. Code Sec. I 1Z38: "There shall be but one form of action, to be known
as a civil action. This requirement does not affect any substantive rights of liability, legal
or equitable." For definition of a "civil action," see Barger v. Cochran, 15 Ohio St. 46o
(x864)s State ex tel Board of Education v. Steeley, zi Ohio App. 396, I53 N.E. z85(i926).
'z' Klonne v. Bradstreet, 7 Ohio St. 322 (1857); Neilson v. Fry, x6 Ohio St. 55z,
91 Am. Dec. xio (z865)i Culver v. Rodgers, 33 Ohio St. 537 (1878); Porter v. Wagner,
36 Ohio St. 471 (z8So). But see De Ran v. Colonial Savings Bank & T. Co., zo Ohio
App. 370, xSz N.E. 303 (i9z5); Raybuck v. Raybuck, 25 Ohio App. 365, 57 N.E. 83!(192T).
"! Wilson v. Stilwell, 9 Ohio St. 467, 75 Am. Dec. 477 (z85g); Culver v. Rodgers,
33 Ohio St. 537 (1878)i Chapman v. Lee, 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N.E. 736 (x887); Wall
v. Federation Co., izi Ohio St. 334, 337, 168 N.E. 847 (xz9). See, Routson v. Jack-
son, zi Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 52!, 5Z8, 30 Ohio D.N.P. 145 (19x8) (affirmed by Court of
Appeals, motion to certify record overruled in 17 Ohio L. Rep. 363, 64 Bull. 46z), which
states, "Where a petition states a case which entitles the plaintiff, to an equitable remedy
but furnishes no basis for legal relief, the court may disregard the prayer if it be for a
judgment at law, and grant the appropriate equitable remedy."
r, See note 52, supra.
16 See note xi, supra; also, Glass v. Courtright, et al, 14 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 273,
23 Ohio Dec. 253, 58 W.L.B. s65 (1913); Hollowell v. Schrader, 96 Ohio St. S99 (1917)
(memorandum opinion following Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St. 443; 113 N.E. 397
(igio); Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 Yale L.J. 645 (1923); Clark, The Union of Law
and Equity, 25 Col. L. Rev. i (i9zS).
1WALsH, Eourrv (text-book ed-x9 3 o)i 98-note 3; See x6 Ohio Jur., Equity, at p.
28: "The result, in general, is that equitable principles and modes of procedure may be
226 LAW JOURNAL -MARCH, 1939
The court in the principal case stated, "Actually this procedure is
equivalent to a suit for specific performance, since the vendor is asking
payment of the agreed consideration in exchange for his deed, and its
sanction accords with the liberality established by our Code of Civil Pro-
cedure."'" The above statement evidences a shift by the Supreme Court
in legal theory; that is, as before stated, the action was treated by the
Counsel and Court as being purely legal and one for the recovery of
money only (a jury trial having been given), whereas the Supreme
Court treated it as equitable. If we have only ofie form of action in
Ohio, is it material whether we call it an action for the recovery of
money only or a suit for specific performance of the contract?"9 If, as
the Supreme Court stated, a judgment for the full purchase price under
an executory contract of sale is virtually a decree of specific perform-
ance, it would seehn advisable to inquire whether legal administrative
devices are adequate for specific performance. Will the equitable doc-
trines of discretion, laches, mistake, hardship, etc., be utilized in admin-
istering relief in actions such as this which aim at specific performance?
Must a contract be capable of specific performance before the court will
render a judgment for the purchase price? It has always been held that:
"A decree of specific performance is not a matter of right but of grace,
granted on equitable principles, and rests in the sound discretion of the
court. This discretion is not, however, arbitrary or capricious, nor is it
applied, under the Codes, to actions which formerly would have been legal, and that as to
equitable actions, remedial rights formerly existing are unimpaired."
But see Marshall, Ch. J. (dissenting), in Union Savings Bank & T. Co. v. Alter,
103 Ohio St. x88, zS, 13z N.E. 834 (xgz8) " . . . equity is a separate system of juris-
prudence having fixed precedents and principles." For general discussion see Sidney
Thompson, "Fifty Years of American Equity," So Harv. L. Rev. s7I-Z52 (1937).
The code in New York caused much dissension on the bench. J. Selden, in Reubens
v. Joel, 13 N.Y. 488, 491 (1856), stated that the two modes of relief (legal and equit-
able) could not be made identical. He conceded the possibility of abolishing one or the
other, or both, but thought that the distinctions between them could not be abolished.
1 . . . They cannot make trial by jury and trial by court the same thing." Accordingly,
he continues, the only way we can have a homogeneous form of action for all cases "is by
abolishing both the forms of trial and the mode of relief in one or the other of the two
classes of actions. . . . " This, admittedly, the legislature has no power to do, and he
therefore concludes that "the essential distinctions between actions at law and suits in
equity are preserved." To same effect see Jackson v. Strong, 22z N.Y. 149, 18 N.E.
512 (1917).
But see N. Y. Ice Co. v. The North Western Ins. Co., (x86I), where Comstock, J.,
thought anything beyond the decision in Reubens v. Joel was individual opinion only.
For comment on the N. Y. cases see 32 Harv. L. Rev. 166 (xq18).
's See note 2, supra.
' A seeming conflict in statements is contained in the syllabus, by the court, in the
principal case. In paragraph two (2) it is stated, "The vendor . . . may msaintain an
action on the contract for the unpaid purchase price. . . . " In paragraph three (3) the
court said, "Before the vendor can enforce the payment of the full purchase price. ... "
Query whether the court realized the implication of the above statements. Is not an action
on a contract commonly thought of as being legal, whereas an attempt to enforce payment
is considered equitable?
governed by the mere pleasure of the court, or by the chancellor's whims,
but it is a judicial discretion controlled by the established doctrines and
settled principles of equity, and by considerations of justice and fair
dealing."2 The general rule is that specific relief will be granted when
it is apparent that it will subserve justice; and it will be withheld when
it appears that it will produce hardship to the defendant.2 If the con-
tract is not certain in its terms,22 and if the undertaking to be enforced
is not founded upon a sufficient and actually valuable consideration, the
specific performance will be withheld. 3 If the agreement is voluntary,
no relief is obtainable in equity.2" A vendor who comes into equity to
enforce the payment of the purchase price must have performed or made
all reasonable efforts towards performance of the obligations on his side
of the contract.2" Other factors given consideration by the courts of
equity before their discretion is exercised are laches,26 fraud, duress,2"
mistake,2" marketable title,30 etc. The judgment rendered in the princi-
pal case was conditioned upon proper tender of deed and deposit of the
same in court. A condition of marketable title was also imposed. -All of
the foregoing discretionary and extraordinary principles were developed
because specific performance was necessary for more adequate relief in
the contract area. The court of appeals in the principal case thought of
the action under discussion as one before a court of law.31 However, the
attitude of the Supreme Court was slightly different. It can best be
summarized by a quotation from its opinion: "The Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, effective since 1853, abolished the distinctions between actions
at law and suits in equity. Under our system of jurisprudence, the same
court is vested with law and chancery jurisdiction. Consequently the
general jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, both at law, and in
-' 37 Ohio Jur., p. 24. et seq., and cases there cited.
"
1 Ambrose v. Kuhn, ii Ohio Dec. Rep. 338, 26 Bull. 1z7 (189i); Huntington v.
Rogers, 9 Ohio St. Sxi (2857).
2, State v. Baum, 6 Ohio 383 (1834); Trent Mill Co. v. Wells-Abbort-Nieman Co.,
1o Ohio App. 297 (19x8)j Lindner Co. v. Myrod Shoe Co., 38 Ohio App. 182, x75 N.E.
879 (1930)i 25 R.C.L., p. ziS.
2 3 Hite v. Hite et al., 22o Ohio St. 253, x66 N.E. 193 (1929); Douglas v. Danger-
field el al, io Ohio x52 (284o).
2" State v. Baum, 6 Ohio 383 (1834); Moeller v. Poland, So Ohio St. 418, 89 N.E.
00 (1909).
2' Wilson v. Tappan, 6 Ohio 172 (2834); Tuttle v. Burgett, 53 Ohio St. 498, 42
N.E. 427, 3o L.R.A. 214, 53 Am. St. Rep. 649 (1895)i Brown v. Haines, iz Ohio i
(xs 8).
"Harris v. Wallace Mfg. Co., 84 Ohio St. 104, 95 N.E. 5g (i922). 16 Ohio
Jur., Equity, p. 192 et seq.
-s See annotation in 87 A.L.R. 1345.
25 R.C.L., p. 240.
25 R.C.L., p. 242; 65 A.L.R.. 97.
*°Galloway v. Barr, iz Ohio 354 (1843); Tiffin v. Shawhan, 43 Ohio St. 278,
i N.E. 581 (x884); Walker v. Scott, 7 Ohio App. 335, 29 O.C.A. 89 (1914).
31 See note 1, supra.
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equity, renders the question involving the boundary line between law
and chancery of less practical importance in the administration of justice
than under judicial systems where courts of law and chancery were
distinct tribunals, or where the two forms of action were strictly pre-
served in the same court."32 Perhaps the Supreme Court was acting in
accordance with a general desire for simplifying practice and unifying
law and equity. Under the Code, the differences between specific
and substitutionary relief and discretionary and rigid application of rem-
edies have no longer a reason for existence.33 The Ohio General Code
states that: "The defendant may set forth in his answer as many
grounds of defense, counter-claim, or set-off as he may have, whether
such as heretofore been denominated legal, or equitable, or both." 3
Since the vendee-may not have any defenses cut off that would have
been available in an action for specific performance, and the court can
impose conditions such as marketable title and proper tender of deed and
deposit thereof in court, as was done in the principal case, it would seem
that complete relief can be given in the "civil action."3 5
Though the holding of the principal case adequately disposed of the
controversy between this plaintiff and defendant, it is appropriate to give
some consideration to the implications and inferences that may arise in
future cases as a result of allowing an action for the purchase price.
Though the only object of the action was to require the defendant to
pay money, if the complaint contains allegations sufficient to maintain an
action for specific performance, the demand for a money judgment
should not necessarily control, characterize the action, or limit the plain-
tiff in respect to the remedy which he may have.36 Merely because the
plaintiff has demanded judgment for a sum of money should not, under
the Code of Civil Procedure, preclude the recovery of the same amount
by way of equitable relief if the facts entitle the plaintiff to such relief.
"An action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
is, in substance, an action to recover the purchase price of land."'" But,
though there was no necessity for discussion of such questions as the right
to trial by jury and the right to appeal in the present case, these problems
will indubitably arise in the future, and these constitutional rights may
be used as a means of testing the procedure used by the Ohio Supreme
Court.
s Citation note 2, supra, at page 393-
aS See 3 WILLissro-, CoNTPRAcTs, Sec. 1376 (1931) where he statea that v:here the
courts of law can reach the same results as a court of equity, the court of law should
invade the province of equity if the equity rule is more just.
"' Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1136.
" See note II, supra.
"6 Bensinger v. Erhardt, 74 App. Div. 169, 77 N.Y. Supp. 577 (x9oz).
37 See note 6, supra.
Those who feel that old distinctions are inherent in the nature of
things ultimately argue the constitutional right of trial by jury. In Ohio,
such right is preserved and cannot be invaded or violated by either legis-
lative act or judicial decree."8 The Ohio General Code recites in part,
" . . . Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only,
or specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury unless a jury
trial be waived . . . "" Since, before the Code of Civil Procedure was
adopted, the existence of separate tribunals kept court and jury trials
apart, the question is substantially an historical one as to the situation that
existed at the time of the adoption of the Code.4" Whether an action is
triable to a court4 or to a jury is determined by the issues presented, and
relief required at the time of the trial.42 The courts of Ohio have been
in some disagreement as to the meaning of "actions for the recovery of
money only."43 The Supreme Court held in one group of cases that the
legislature had, by force of the statute, extended the right of trial by
jury to issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only,
even though "the action may be founded on principles which are of an
equitable nature and origin." 44 However, a later case held that "this
section4 does not extend the right of trial by jury to cases which call
for any form of relief peculiar to a court of equity." 46 The code pro-
visions in a majority of code states enumerate, as does the Ohio code,
2 Newnam's Lessee v. Cincinnati, x8 Ohio 323 (1849); Gibbs v. Girard, 88 Ohio
St. 34, 1oz N.E. 299 (1913). Under the Ohio Bill of Rights, "the right to trial by jury
should be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the render-
ing of a verdict by the concurrence of not less than three-fourths of the jury." Ohio
Const., Art. i, Sec. 55 See: Vork v. State, z Ohio St. 296, 59 Am. Dec. 673 (2853).
"' Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11379, (italics inserted). For history of section, see Ireland
v. Cheney, x29 Ohio St. 527, z Ohio Op. 523, r96 N.E. z67 (193)-
"' Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St. 443, 113 N.E. 397 (3930)5 Ireland v. Cheney,
129 Ohio St. 527, 2 Ohio Op. 523, 196 N.E. 267 (1935)-
'Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 138o: "All other issues of fact shall be tried by the court,
subject to its power to order any issue to be tried by a jury, or referred."
'2 Taylor v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 287, 33o N.E. 739, 63 W.L.B. X84 (935); Brick
& Mining Co. v. Schatzinger, x6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 356, 28 Ohio C.D. 654 (3905).
"See note 38, sopra.
"Vebb v. Stascl, So Ohio St. 322, 88 N.E. 143 (3909); Improvement Co. v.
Malone, 78 Ohio St 232, 8 N.E. 51 (i908), overruling Black v. Boyd, 5o Ohio St. 46,
33 N.E. 207 (I8 9 3 )-"If the relief sought is a judgment for money only, the fact that
before the adoption of our code the proper remedy would have been a suit in equity does
not affect the right of either party to a trial by jury upon any issue of fact made by the
pleadings." Gansaullus v. Pettit, 46 Ohio St. 27, 17 N.E. 233 (i888). See also Hall v.
Bell, S4 Ohio St. 228, 43 N.E. 584 (x896).
" See note 38, supra.
"'Holing v. Columbus, 33 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 409 (39z2); [affirmed, Walcutt v.
Holing, 5 Ohio App. 326 (3933), affirmed Walcutt v. Holing, 92 Ohio St. 5S8 (3935),
criticizing, Lange v. Lange, 69 Ohio St. 346, 69 N.E. 633 (1904); Improvement Co. v.
Malone, 78 Ohio St. 232, 85 N.E. 51 (39o8); Webb v. Stasel, So Ohio St. 322, 88 N.E.
143 (1909)]. See also 24 Ohio Jur., Jury, z44.
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actions in which the right to trial by jury shall exist.47 These statutes
are generally construed as declaratory of the actions at law in which the
right of trial by jury existed when the constitutional provision was
established.4"
It is generally agreed that trial by jury is in no way inconsistent with
code merger of law and equity. If the facts pleaded call for legal relief
(which the court must decide'as a matter of law), the case should be
tried to a jury; if equitable relief is needed instead of, or in addition to,
legal relief, the judge presiding is a court of equity with full power to
grant the relief required within the facts as pleaded and established. 9
"The jury should be considered only as one of several bodies available
for determining the facts, as it is, and not as a central pivot about which
the whole case revolves, the only result being to require the use of this
particular body as the fact-finding machinery in this case." 5
The test as laid down by this section"' of the General Code is not
whether a personal judgment is asked, but whether or not the action is
for the "recovery of money only."52 On the assumption that a vendor's
suit for the purchase price under an executory contract of sale is an
"action for the recovery of money only," the parties would be entitled
to a jury trial. However, there is dictum in Ohio to the effect that "an
action for the recovery of the entire purchase price would still be a pro-
41 See references to codes of many states: CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 56, note 5s. Conn.
Gen. St. 1918, Sec. 575z: providing that all matters which, prior to Jan. I, s88o, were
within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, whether directly or as incident to other
matters before it, unless otherwise ordered, shall be heard and decided by the court without
a jury, in the manner theretofore practised by the courts of equity.
4 See cases cited CLARK, CODE PLEADINO, p. 59, note 6z; 35 C.J., p. 159 et seg.
"Jury trial does not prevent the merger of systems, actions, and courts as expressly pro-
vided in the Code. . . . Just as the bringing together of law and equity does not change
substantive equity or substantive law, so also it does not change, and was not intended to
change, the method of trial of issues of fact used in applying legal and equitable rem-
edies."-WALsH, E ourr, xi6 (1930). See also, Schwindt v. Gracef, 2o9 Ohio St. 4o4,
4o6, 242 N.E. 736 (2gz4.); Belding v. State, xzs Ohio St. 393, 269 N.E. 302 (2929)-
" WALSH, Eousry, pp. izo-zs (2930), and cases there cited; Also, Rowland v.
Entrekin, 27 Ohio St. 47 (z875); Vose v. Murray, 5o Ohio St. 29, 32 N.E. issz (2893)i
Taylor v. Brown, 9z Ohio St. 287, 220 N.E. 739 (s91s); Mining Co. v. Schateinger,
16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 356, z8 Ohio C.D. 654 (2923).
'o Comment, 3z Yale L.J. 707 (2922), showing history and development of the jury
as a fact finding body. The writer concluded by saying that, "the jury is a kind of safety
valve for the judicial system. It relieves the judges of the burden and odium of deciding
close questions of fact in cases ...where feelings of litigants are apt to run high.
Surely it is a loss to extend the field of its application by the application of the constitu-
tional strait jacket where not necessary."
See Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 2S Col. L. Rev. s (29z); "This consti-
tutional right (of trial by jury) causes sufficient bother in trials, is a sufficient hindrance
to effective trial work; we ought, therefore, by no means to give more scope than it
actually deserves."51 See note 38, supra.
"
2 Hague v. Hague, zi Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 406 (zg), affrmed without opinion, 8S
Ohio St. 488 (igog); Maginnis v. Schwab, 24 Ohio St. 336 (2873); Coble v. Howard,
2z Ohio St. x65, x68 (s86s).
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ceeding for specific performance," 3 and as before stated, the Supreme
Court in the principal case made a statement very similar to the above
dictum."' If such be true, in a civil action, where the facts stated in the
petition and the nature of the relief primarily demanded are solely
equitable, neither party can, of right, demand a jury trial." However,
in an action primarily for money, and where a personal judgment is
claimed, though equitable relief is sought thereby, the parties may demand
a jury trial." Thus we see that a very real question may arise in the
future as a result of the holding in the principal case. Another equally
important possibility of controversy is the right of appeal. It would serve
no immediate purpose to develop the history and present availability of
this means of review, as was done above in the right to a jury trial, it
being sufficient to suggest appealability as a difficulty that may arise from
a court's holding that the vendor may maintain an action for the pur-
chase price on an executory contract of sale.
Aside from the foregoing possible barriers, it would seem that if
the vendor wishes to rely on a general money judgment, when the
vendee is protected by the conditional decree, there is no real reason to
refuse such relief when the facts stated show the plaintiff to have a cause
of action, even though the granting of such necessitates a shifting of
theory from that employed by counsel and the trial court. Whether this
be considered as a suit for specific performance with a decree of m~ney
only, or a legal action for the recovery of money only with equitable
principles carried over in the granting of the legal relief asked, at least
the Supreme Court of Ohio erased the lines of demarcation between the
two in the principal case, and did not, as the counsel for the plaintiff-
appellant in their brief filed in the Supreme Court accused the court of
appeals, "render a decision that is a 'throw back' to a system long
discarded."
MARGARETTA BEYNON
53 Pierce v. Stewart, 61 Ohio St. 422, 426, 56 N.E. 2ox (x9oo) (no right to a
jury trial in specific performance action). See, Jones v. Booth, 38 Ohio St. 405 (189z)
[cited Hull v. Bell, 54 Ohio St. z28 (1896)]-an action for the specific performance of a
contract and for the payment of money held for the court.
' See note 17, supra.
" Rowland v. Entrekin, 27 Ohio St. 47 (1875). But see Hager v. Reed, ii Ohio St.
626, 635 (z86o), where in an action for judgment value of stock contracted to be bought
by the defendant, specific performance was decreed though it was not stated to be such an
action, and the court held that it was competent for the court to permit the jury to find
issues of fact, for their finding was approved by the court and judgment entered for the
plaintiff.
ra Brundbridge v. Goodlove, 30 Ohio St. 374 (1876).
